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EXTENT OF STATE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE MOTOR FREIGHT CARRIERS
HELEN W. MUNSERT'

N DECEMBER, 1935, a trucking company, wishing to
demonstrate the merits of motor carriage of freight,
sent a fleet of five trucks and trailers on a test run from
Chicago to Los Angeles and back to New York. Precautions were taken in advance to guard against loss of time.
Out of 110 hours elapsed time to Los Angeles, 22 hours
and 22 minutes were spent in delay of which 20 hours and
24 minutes were avoidable. Lack of uniformity in state
laws regulating motor carriers was an important factor
in the loss of time.
While it has been settled that interstate commerce is
2
subject to regulation only by the Federal government,
the right of the state to regulate persons within its jurisdiction in the exercise of its police power is recognized,
providing such regulation does not directly conflict with
Federal legislation on the subject.3
Each state builds roads and maintains them at a considerable cost to the people. Interstate motor carriers
use these roads without the overhead cost of a right of
way. It is only just, therefore, that compensation to the
state be made for such use. Regulation of the vehicles
engaged in interstate commerce is not unconstitutional
where based on this use of state-owned highways, but
such regulation must conform to certain restrictions, to
be reviewed in this discussion.
1 Member of the Illinois Bar; alumna of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
2 U. S. Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8.
3 Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 38 L. Ed. 962
(1894) ; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 42 L. Ed. 878
(1898) ; Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Conley, 230 U. S. 513, 57 L. Ed. 1597
(1913)
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 76 L. Ed.
1155 (1932); Bradley v. Public Util. Comm., 289 U. S. 92, 77 L. Ed. 1053
(1933); Ashbury Truck Co. v. R. R. Comm. of Calif., 52 F. (2d) 263
(1931) ; Phillips v. Moulton, 54 F. (2d) 119 (1931) ; Ogden & Moffett Co.
v. Mich. Public Util. Comm., 58 F. (2d) 832 (1931).
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REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
4
The basic doctrine was declared in Smith v. Alabama
regarding a statute forbidding any engineer to operate a
train unless physically fit, where the court said:
But the provisions on the subject contained in the statute of
Alabama under consideration are not regulations of interstate
commerce. It is a misnomer to call them such. Considered in
themselves, they are parts of that body of the local law which,
as we have already seen, properly governs the relation between
carriers of passengers and merchandise and the public who employ them, which are not displaced until they come in conflict
with express enactments of Congress in the exercise of its power
over commerce, and which, until so displaced, according to the
evident intention of Congress, remain as the law governing carriers in the discharge of their obligations, whether engaged in
the purely internal commerce of the state or in commerce among
the states.
When such regulation by the state, by virtue of its unreasonableness, becomes a direct burden on interstate
commerce, and what requirements by the states have been
sustained, are pertinent enquiries. Let it be said here
that the passage of the new Motor Carrier Act in 19351
will change a great deal of this law, as it represents the
express enactments of Congress on a subject heretofore
unregulated. The possible effect of this act will be the
subject of speculation in the closing paragraphs of this
discussion.
A state may tax a motor vehicle belonging to a nonresident and moving in interstate commerce, with certain
restrictions on such power; and in so far as an interstate
operator wishes to move between fixed termini within the
state on a regular schedule as a carrier for hire, he may
be required to obtain a certificate of public convenience
and necessity from the state commission, and to conform
to particular requirements as to size, equipment, insurance, and so on. Whether or not such statutes are invalid

4 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. Ed. 508 (1888).
5 U. S. C. A., Tit. 49, secs. 301-327.
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as directly interfering with interstate commerce is a
question for the courts to decide, and it is purposed to
point out in this paper the extent to which a state may go
in regulation of motor vehicles engaged in interstate commerce. Since the question is one of constitutional law,
the principal cases cited are necessarily those decided in
the United States Supreme or District Courts.
STATE LICENsE TAX

The first and most important phase of the matter is
that involving the direct levying of a tax. A state can
neither lay a tax on the act of engaging in interstate commerce nor on the gross receipts therefrom,8 but interstate carriers are not wholly immune from state taxation
even though its burden is indirectly or incidentally imposed upon interstate commerce.7 State taxation for use
of the highways is not a violation of the commerce
clause. 8 The important thing is that the statute show
clearly that it is intended to protect the highways and
relate thereto. The basis for exaction of the tax, and
the use of the proceeds therefrom, must be predicated on
the theory of contribution to the state roads.
A leading case discussing these points is Clark v. Poor."
This was a bill to enjoin enforcement of the Ohio Motor
Transportation Act. The Ohio statute provided that any
6 Leloup v. Port of Mobile,
People, 135 U. S. 161, 34 L.
State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185,
Tax Comm., 283 U. S. 465,
Freight Lines v. Perry, 47 F.

127 U. S. 640, 32 L. Ed. 311 (1888) ; Lyng v.
Ed. 150 (1890); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio
41 L. Ed. 965 (1897) ; East Ohio Gas Co. v.
75 L. Ed. 1171 (1931) ; Johnson Transfer &
(2d) 900 (1931) ; Nutt v. Ellerbe, 56 F. (2d)

1058 (1932).

7 Nashville, C. & St. L. R. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 77 L. Ed. 730
(1933) ; Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., 289 U. S. 249, 77 L. Ed.

1155 (1933).

8 Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 44 L. Ed. 725 (1900) ; Hendrick v.
Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 59 L. Ed. 385 (1915); Kane v. New Jersey, 242
U. S. 160, 61 L. Ed. 222 (1916) ; Interstate Busses Corp v. Holyoke St. R.
Co., 273 U. S. 45, 71 L. Ed. 530 (1927) ; Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554, 71
L. Ed. 1199 (1927); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245, 72
L. Ed. 551 (1928); Alkazin v. Wells, 47 F. (2d) 904 (1931) ; Prouty v.
Coyne, 55 F. (2d) 289 (1932) ; Roadway Express v. Murray, 60 F. (2d)
293 (1932); Aero-Mayflower Transit Co. v. Grosjean, 3 F. Supp. 527
(1932).
9 274 U. S. 554, 71 L. Ed. 1199 (1927).
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motor transportation company wishing to operate in the
state should first obtain a certificate from the Public Utilities Commission, and pay a tax graduated according to
the number and capacity of the vehicles used. Clark and
Riggs, plaintiffs, operated as common carriers a motor
truck line between Indiana and Ohio, engaging only in
interstate commerce. They refused to apply for a certificate or pay the tax, and brought this suit to prevent
enforcement of the act against them. The commission
was willing to grant such a certificate as a matter of
course upon application and compliance with other phases
of the law. The plaintiffs claimed that the act was unconstitutional as applied to them because interstate commerce could only be regulated by Congress. The Supreme
Court affirmed dismissal of the bill, holding the state
statute constitutional. The opinion said that highways
were public property and owned by the State, so that
users of them were subject to regulation by the State to
insure safety of its people and convenience and conservation of the roads themselves. ° Since common carriers
are using the roads more than other operators of vehicles,
they may be charged extra for employing them in their
business.
10 Citing Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 59 L. Ed. 385 (1915)
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 61 L. Ed. 222 (1916) ; Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U. S. 352, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).
The latest reaffirmance of the doctrine is found in the decision handed
down by the Supreme Court on May 18, 1936, in the case of Morf v.
Bingaman, Supreme Court No. 772. The court upheld the constitutionality
of a statute of New Mexico exacting a flat permit fee for the privilege of
transporting motor vehicles, on their own wheels, over the state highways
for the purpose of sale within or without the state, as applied to dealers
transporting such cars in caravans over the highways. The court said:
"There is ample support for a legislative determination that the peculiar
character of this traffic involves a special type of use of the highways, with
enhanced wear and tear on the roads and augmented hazards to other traffic,
which imposes on the state a heavier financial burden for highway maintenance and policing than do other types of motor car traffic. We cannot
say that these circumstances do not afford an adequate basis for special
licensing and taxing provisions, whose only effect, even when applied to
interstate traffic, is to enable the state to police it, and to impose upon it a
reasonable charge, to defray the burden of this expense, and for the privilege
of using the state highways."
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The plaintiffs complained further that the tax could
not be sustained for upkeep of the highways, since not
all of it was used for maintenance and repair thereof,
some being used for the expense of administration and
enforcement of the act and some for other purposes. The
court held that this was immaterial and since the tax was
assessed for a proper purpose and was not objectionable
in amount, the use to which the proceeds were put did
not concern plaintiffs.
BASIS OF CLASSIFICATION FOR TAX

The taxes levied on motor trucks are usually based on
carrying capacity, with figures based on the gross weight
including the maximum load, or net weight, while those
on passenger cars are based on horse power. There may
also be a mileage tax, in addition to the license fee, and
a gasoline tax, all of which will be discussed later. The
classifications based on the carrying capacity of trucks,
and those based on horse power, used in determining the
amount of the license fee, have both been upheld in the
United States Supreme Court.
In Hicklin v. Coney" the defendants, private contract
carrier engag- in interstate commerce, refused to pay
the license fees required by the statute of South Carolina.
The Railroad Commission of the state brought this suit
in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
state to enforce the statute. The defendants claimed the
statute as applied to an interstate carrier was contrary
to the commerce clause, because the license fees were
based on the carrying capacity of the vehicles. The court
upheld the statute, saying,
Carrying capacity, the size and weight of trucks, unquestionably
have a direct relation to the wear and hazards of the highways.
It is for this reason that the authority of the State to impose
directly reasonable limitations on the weight and size of vehicles,
although applicable to interstate carriers, has been sustained.
11 290 U. S. 169, 78 L. Ed. 247 (1933).
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[Citations.] As the State may establish such regulations directly,
the State may adjust its license fees, otherwise valid as being
reasonable and exacted as compensation for the use of the highways, according to carrying capacity in furtherance of the same

purpose.
12
Graduation according to weight is a valid classification.
Hendrick v. Maryland,'3 a case involving the classification based on horse power, was a prosecution before a
justice of the peace for violation of the Maryland motor
vehicle law. The defendant lived in the District of Columbia and drove into Maryland. While temporarily there,
he was arrested for operating his car without a certificate
of registration. The statute had a section which provided
that a nonresident who had complied with the laws of his
own state for registration could obtain a special tag and
permission to operate for a temporary period without the
Maryland license, but residents of the District of Columbia were denied such privilege. The defendant contended
the statute was void on several grounds, one of which was
that the tax, based on a difference in horse power, was
exacted according to an arbitrary classification, and
that any such attempt to regulate interstate commerce
was void. The court held the statute valid as a reasonable
exercise of the State's police power. As to the classification according to horse power, Mr. Justice McReynolds
said in the opinion,
As the capacity of machine owned by plaintiff in error does
not appear, he cannot complain of discrimination because fees
are imposed according to engine power. Distinctions amongst
motor machines and between them and other vehicles may be
proper,-essential, indeed,-and those now challenged are not
obviously arbitrary or oppressive. The statute is not a mere
revenue measure, and a discussion of the classifications permissible under such an act would not be pertinent.
12 Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U. S. 66, 74 L. Ed. 704 (1930);
Aero-Mayflower Transit Co. v. Watson, 5 F. Supp. 1009 (1934) ; Grolbert v.
Board, 60 F. (2d) 321 (1932); Roadway Express v. Murray, 60 F. (2d)
293 (1932).
13 235 U. S. 610, 59 L. Ed. 385 (1915).
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The Hendrick case was cited the following year, in
Kane v. New Jersey,4 as authority for the statement that
the power of the state to regulate the use of motor
vehicles on its highways is properly exercised in imposing a license fee graduated according to the horse power
of the engine. A good explanation of the reasoning under6 decided
lying such statutes appears in Re Schuler,"
by
the California Supreme Court. The court ruled that the
due process clause of the Constitution was not violated by
the provisions of an act imposing a license tax based on
horse power, since the intent of the legislature was to
fix the tax with some reference to the destruction of the
highways by the vehicle, and while such method was not
the most scientific basis it was not without justification.
DuAL TAXATION

In connection with the necessity for the state license
tax there arises the problem of the city license tax and
whether such dual taxation is valid, even when nondiscriminatory. The constitutionality of such requirement
was discussed in Carley & Hamilton v. Snook,1 6 although
that case involved an intrastate carrier. The suit arose
by a bill to enjoin collection of the California motor
vehicle registration tax. The plaintiffs declared that certain sections of the act were unconstitutional. Particularly, objection was made to the classifications based on
load and to the fact that they were required to pay any
state license tax at all. The proceeds of the tax, after
deduction for support of the division of motor vehicles,
were distributed half to the counties for upkeep of roads
maintained by them and half to the maintenance of state
roads. All incorporated cities in California had passed
ordinances imposing registration license fees on motor
vehicles, and 75 per cent of the amount so collected went
14 242 U. S. 160, 61 L. Ed. 222 (1916).
15 167 Cal. 282, 139 P. 685 (1914).
16 281 U. S. 66, 74 L. Ed. 704 (1930).
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to the repair of the city streets. The plaintiffs operated
exclusively or principally over highways within the limits
of such cities, and paid the city taxes, but they claimed
that the fees were in effect "tolls" for the use of the
highways and that to compel them to pay for support of
roads they didn't use was a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The validity of the law was sustained by the court. It
was held that there is nothing in the Constitution which
requires a state to apply fees for the benefit of those
who pay them. The objection against paying both city and
state fees was overruled, the court saying:
The objection that the appellants should not be required to
pay the challenged fees because they are already paying the city
license tax is but the familiar one, often rejected, that a state
may not, by different statutes, impose two taxes upon the same
subject-matter, although, concededly, the total tax, if imposed by
a single taxing statute, would not transgress the due process
clause.
As to the objection that these were "tolls" prohibited
by the Federal Highway Act, 1 7 wherein it was provided
that all highways constructed or reconstructed under the
act should be free from all tolls, it was held that these
registration fees were not tolls in the sense of a proprietor's charge for the privilege of passage over a road or
bridge, but were taxes by the state for the use of its
highways.
MILEAGE TAX

Many states levy a mileage tax. In Johnson Transfer
& Freight Lines v. Perry"'such a tax was held valid, even
though there was also exacted a gasoline tax, proceeds
from which went to defray highway costs. Two carriers
brought a bill for an injunction against enforcement of
the Georgia motor vehicle act. One of the complainants
was a private carrier resident in Alabama, and the other
17 U. S. C., Tit. 23, sec. 9.
18 47 F. (2d) 900 (1931).
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was a common carrier resident in Tennessee, both operating freight trucks regularly between Bimingham, Alabama, and Chattanooga, Tennessee. The only paved road
available passed for twenty-three miles through Georgia
over a highway rebuilt with Federal aid. Neither carrier
accepted or delivered freight in Georgia, simply passing
through the state of necessity.
The complainants applied to the State Public Service
Commission for a certificate and for the annual licenses
required by Georgia, tendering the necessary fees. The
commission refused to consider these applications unless
made on its particular printed form which contained an
agreement to observe all requirements of the Georgia
statute and to abide by all commission regulations, nor
unless the applicants would give bond as required by the
act "to secure the owner against loss or damage to
freight," and would deposit $75 to secure payment of the
mileage tax which amounted to three-fourths of a cent
per mile traveled. The applicants refused to sign such
printed form, give such bond, (although they were willing
to give one protecting the public from negligent injuries),
or pay such deposit. Certificates were refused them, and
the commission prosecuted the drivers of the trucks for
not having the proper licenses.
The basis upon which the injunction against such prosecution was sought was that the statute thus applied violated the commerce clause and the equal protection
clause, as well as the Federal Highway Act prohibiting
tolls. The court granted an interlocutory injunction on
two grounds, first, that the requirement for the bond was
invalid as applied to plaintiffs, and second, that they need
not sign the printed agreement which was also invalid
as applied to them. The exaction of a promise to obey
every requirement of the commission and of the statute
was held bad as an attempt to require a private carrier to
become a common carrier, 9 and the requirement of cargo
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indemnity insurance was also invalid as not being related
to the use of the roads.
The demand of the tax deposit, however, was valid
even though required only of those operating between
fixed termini, because there was a reasonable basis for the
distinction. The tax on the basis of mileage, scaled according to the size of the vehicle and the actual use of
the road, is valid, being predicated on the need of the
highways for repair and replacement." The fact that
there is likewise a gasoline tax to contribute to the upkeep of the roads is no reason for excusing payment of
the mileage tax. The carrier may not purchase any gasoline in the state at all, especially where, as here, the actual
mileage traveled in Georgia is so slight. He cannot
complain that he pays two or more taxes if each is for a
justified purpose and if they exceed no constitutional limit.
Another example of a statute assessing a mileage tax
was found in the Oklahoma motor vehicle act, which
divided carriers into three classes: Class A-common
carriers between fixed termini and with regular routes;
class B-all carriers not in classes A or C; and class Call carriers transporting their own goods but collecting
for such carriage, with some specific exceptions not material to the issue. In addition to the regular automobile
license taxes, a mileage tax of two-fifths of a cent per
mile on each vehicle was levied, for carriers in class A,
and for those in class B, one-half cent per mile on each
vehicle.
In the case of Roadway Express v. Murray"' this tax
was attacked as being unconstitutional and discriminatory. The court sustained its validity as being necessary
to the maintenance of the state roads and held that the
19 Finn v. R. Comm., 2 F. Supp. 891 (1933); Denver & R. G. W. Ry. Co.
v. Linck, 56 F. (2d) 957 (1932) ; Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 77
L. Ed. 288 (1932).
20 Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245, 72 L. Ed. 551
(1928).
21 60 F. (2d) 293 (1932).
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distinction between class A and class B carriers was reasonable because the common carriers over a regular route
were much less difficult to inspect and supervise, and
collection of the tax from them much easier than from a
periodic carrier. The difference is not disproportionate
but reasonable and justified.
GASOLINE TAX

A third possible tax which may be levied by the state
to support its roads, beyond the license tax and mileage
tax, is the gasoline tax. The distinction between a valid
and an invalid tax on gasoline was pointed out in Central
Transfer Company v. Commercial Oil Company et al.22
That case was a suit for an injunction against the Attorney General of Missouri to restrain collection of the state
gasoline tax. The plaintiff was a Missouri corporation
engaged solely in interstate commerce, hauling freight
from St. Louis, Missouri, to East St. Louis, Illinois. It
brought this suit in the Federal District Court on the
ground that a Federal question was involved-the constitutionality of the Missouri Motor Fuel Law. The contentions were that the tax violated the due process clause
and was discriminatory, and was a direct tax on interstate commerce since it compelled the plaintiff to pay a
tax on gasoline bought in Missouri but used in interstate
commerce.
The court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction,
holding that no real Federal question was involved since
the statute was not unconstitutional. It distinguished
this tax from that held void in Helson v. Kentucky,23
where the state of Kentucky attempted to tax gasoline
bought in Illinois but being used in Kentucky. In that
case the court specifically said:
While a state has power to tax property having a situs within

its limits, whether employed in interstate commerce or not, it
22 45 F. (2d) 400 (1930).
23 279 U. S. 245, 73 L. Ed. 683 (1929).
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cannot interfere with interstate commerce through the imposition of a tax which is, in effect, a tax for the privilege of transacting such commerce.
In the former case, the state was taxing a commodity
which had come to rest within its limits, as a pure excise
tax, and whether it was to be used in interstate commerce
or not was immaterial. To hold otherwise would result
in a maze of difficulties since everyone driving outside
the state or contemplating such would insist on an exemption theref or.
PURPOSE OF STATE TAX

The purpose for which a valid tax may be levied on
vehicles moving in interstate commerce is clearly limited
to such amount as constitutes a fair contribution to the
upkeep of the highways. The taxpayer may question such
purpose, and if he shows that the tax bears no reasonable
relation to that end, it will not be sustained. The leading
case on that subject is Interstate Transit v. Lindsey.24
The Tennessee act imposed a privilege tax according to
carrying capacity on interstate motor bus carriers. An
Ohio corporation paid the tax under protest and brought
this suit to recover the amount back, claiming that the
statute violated the commerce clause. The tax was based
solely on seating capacity of the bus operating in interstate commerce, and the proceeds, by the exact words of
the statute were to "go and belong exclusively to the
general funds of the state" while the other state motor
vehicle taxes were expressly allocated to a segregated
highway fund.
The court declared the tax invalid, since it was clearly
not predicated on use of the highways. For one thing,
as levied on buses, it was based solely on earning capacity, since it was the number of passengers which could
be carried, not those in fact carried, which determined the
amount. Further, the proceeds of the tax not being ex24

283 U. S. 183, 75 L. Ed. 953 (1931).
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pressly for the use of the highway department, there was
no other basis for sustaining the charge as relating to
the wear and tear on such highways. It was plainly a
privilege tax for the actual carrying on of interstate bus
traffic and as such a direct interference with interstate
commerce.
The burden is always on the state, where a tax of this
sort is questioned, to prove that the purpose of the taxing statute is to pay the cost of administration thereof,
and then to obtain a fair compensation for the construction, repair, maintenance and improvement of the state
roadways.
CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY

The requirement that a common carrier engaged solely
in interstate commerce obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity has been contended to be an unconstitutional burden by the state on interstate commerce.
There is, however, a distinction made between demanding
compliance with the regulatory provision of the statute
as a condition precedent to such certificate, and merely
requiring such certificate as a permit to use the roads,
which will be granted as a matter of course to an interstate carrier. If the certificate can, by statute, be refused
on the ground that public convenience and necessity do
not justify its issuance, the refusal is a void interference
with the free flow of commerce. 25 But requiring such
certificate before using the highways without attaching
regulatory conditions thereto, is proper in view of the
fact that an interstate carrier has no better right than
any other carrier to use the state's highways without its
consent or without paying for it. 26 As was said in
25 Atlantic-Pacific Stages v. Stahl, 36 F. (2d) 260 (1930) ; Re Paradox
Land & Transport Co., P. U. R. 1928A, 648 (1928); Re Lewis, P. U. R.

1931B, 487 (1931); State ex rel. R. Corers. v. Martin, 210 Iowa 207, 230
N. W. 540 (1930).
26 Johnson Transfer & Freight Lines v. Perry, 47 F. (2d) 900 (1931);
Cannonball Transp. Co. v. American Stages, 53 F. (2d) 1051 (1931).
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Atlantic-Pacific Stages v. Stahl, 27
A state may require an interstate carrier to obtain a permit

before using the highways of the state and may condition the
issuance of that permit upon compliance by the carrier with such
laws as those described-such laws, that is, as it is proper for the
state to enact, not including, however, any law either prohibiting
or imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce.
The certificate must issue as a matter of course to interstate carriers, providing they pay the reasonable fee
therefor.
Buck v. Kuykendall 2 presented the question of the
validity of a requirement of such certificate. A bill was
filed to enjoin enforcement of the Washington motor
vehicle statute which prohibited common carriers for hire
from using the highways without first having obtained
from the director of public works a certificate of public
convenience and necessity. The state Supreme Court
had construed the statute to apply to common carriers
engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. Buck, a
citizen of Washington, wished to operate an auto stage
line between Seattle, Washington, and Portland, Oregon,
as a common carrier for interstate traffic exclusively.
He obtained an Oregon license; and alleging willingness
to comply with all applicable regulations concerning common carriers, he applied for a Washington certificate of
public convenience and necessity. The certificate was refused on the ground that the territory in question was
already adequately served by four auto stage lines holding such certificates from the state of Washington. Buck
brought suit against Kuykendall, director of public
works, to enjoin interference with the operation of the
projected line. The injunction was denied and the bill
dismissed in the lower court. The Supreme Court reversed the case, holding that the primary purpose of this
statute was not regulation with a view to conservation of
27
28

36 F. (2d) 260 (1929).
267 U. S. 307, 69 L. Ed. 623 (1925).
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the highways, but the prohibition of competition. And,
although Oregon had issued its certificate, which was
equivalent to saying that public convenience and necessity demanded the bus line, Washington denied it, which
was an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. This
was clearly invalid because an invasion of a field reserved
for Federal regulation.
The imposition of a special permit tax to compensate
the officers entrusted with enforcement of the state highway laws is not justified where there are regular license
fees exacted. Since part of the proceeds of such fees go
to the administration of the statute, such special permit
29
tax is unwarranted.
The right of the state to refuse to permit an interstate
carrier to operate where he has not complied with the
reasonable requirements of the statutes is absolute.
However, difficulty lies in determining if the statute is
reasonable and not a burden on interstate commerce, so
that denial of a certificate to operate is necessary to
promote the public safety. If it is so necessary, and
the reason for refusal is solely onon-compi ance-.,-with
proper laws, conforming to the principles hitherto illustrated, then the commerce clause is not violated by such
denial.30
31
In Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke it
was held that imposition upon a private carrier of a duty
to operate as a common carrier under a permit was an
unlawful burden on interstate commerce. The Michigan
statute provided that no person should engage or continue
in the business of transporting persons or property by
motor vehicle for hire upon the public highways, over a
fixed route or between fixed termini, unless he first obtained permission so to do from the state public utilities
29

Roadway Express v. Murray,'60 F. (2d) 293 (1932).

30 Bradley v. Public Util. Comm. 289 U. S. 92, 77 L. Ed. 1053 (1933)

Southern Coach Corp. v. Frazier, 60 F. (2d) 594 (1932).
81

266 U. S. 570, 69 L. Ed. 445 (1925).

REGULATION OF INTERSTATE MOTOR CARRIERS

255

commission. The plaintiff, seeking to restrain enforcement of the act against him, was a private contract carrier. The court held that to enforce this act against
plaintiff was in effect to compel him to become a common
carrier, and said:
But it is well settled that a state has no power to fetter the
right to carry on interstate commerce within its borders by the
imposition of conditions or regulations which are unnecessary
and pass beyond the bounds of what is reasonable and suitable
for the proper exercise of its power in the field that belongs to it.
To enforce the act against the plaintiff would be to take
from him the use of instrumentalities "by means of
which he carries on the interstate commerce in which he
is engaged as a private carrier, and so directly to burden
and interfere with it." So the court held that the requirements to be exacted of the plaintiff had no relation
to public safety or order in the use of motor vehicles
upon the highways, or to the collection of compensation
for the use thereof, and were consequently in violation
of the Federal Constitution.
LIMITATION OF LOAD OF VEHICLE

Our next consideration concerns the restrictions upon
motor vehicles and the operators thereof which may be
enforced by the state.
The question of the right of the state to limit the actual
size and weight of any motor vehicle traveling upon
its highways is an apt one. If the basis of any regulation
of an interstate motor carrier is the injury to the highway, then it would seem logical that anything having a
direct bearing on such injury could be limited. So it was
held in Morris v. Duby.2 The plaintiffs therein operated
motor trucks for hire on the Columbia River highway in
Oregon and had complied with all the state rules and
regulations respecting the operation along such highway
of motor carriers carrying a combined maximum gross
32 274 U. S. 135, 71 L. Ed. 966 (1927).
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load of not exceeding 22,000 pounds. The highway commission, under an Oregon law, reduced the maximum to
16,500 pounds by an order reciting that the road was being damaged by heavier loads. The plaintiffs filed suit
to enjoin enforcement of the order on the ground it
invaded their constitutional rights. The suit was dismissed in the lower court and appealed to the Supreme
Court. The Oregon statute provided that the highway
commission could grant special permits to vehicles carrying in excess of 22,000 pounds, and that whenever in the
judgment of the commission it would be for the best interests of the state and for protection from undue damage
of any highway to reduce the maximum weights and
speeds for vehicles, authority was given so to do. The
order complained of found that the road was being damaged because of the loads moving maximum weights at
maximum speeds, and therefore reduced the maximum
to 16,500 pounds and directed that changes be made in
respect to tires and their width. The plaintiffs claimed
that the acts of Congress and of Oregon constituted a
contract giving them a right to the heavier load wich
could not be impaired, and that they could not make a
profit with a lighter load.
The court held that the mere fact that plaintiffs could
not make a profit with the lesser load did not prove the
regulation discriminatory or unreasonable. In the absence of any averments of specific facts showing fraud
or abuse of discretion, the judgment of the highway commission that such weight is injurious to the highway for
the use of the public, and increases the cost of repair, is
conclusive. The state has a right to protect its roads
and nothing binds it contractually to continue its previously given permission to operate a vehicle carrying a
particular weight.
LIMITATION OF SIZE OF VEHICLE

The Texas Motor Vehicle Act, fixing a seven thousand
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pound net load limit on trucks, was attacked as unconstitutional in Sproles v. Binford 8 This statute fixed stated
limitations of size-outside width, height including load,
and length-and prohibited to operation of any "vehicle"
exceeding these limitations, unless under a special permit
to be granted in exceptional cases. Plaintiffs sought to
restrain enforcement of the act by claiming the restrictions were unreasonable and arbitrary, had no substantial relation to highway protection, and were repugnant
to the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court went into the comprehensive findings of the District Court concerning the status of the
plaintiffs as carriers in both intrastate and interstate
commerce and their investments in equipment, the capacities of all registered vehicles, the miles and kinds of
highways in Texas, representing public investment of
more than two hundred and fifty million dollars, the increase in the number of trucks, and the dangers of excessively loaded trucks and vehicles of greater width or
length than that prescribed by the statute. The court held
that the findings were supported by the evidence and
said:
In exercising its authority over its highways the State is not
limited to the raising of revenue for maintenance and reconstruction, or to regulations as to the manner in which vehicles shall be
operated, but the State may also prevent the wear and hazards
due to excessive size of vehicles and weight of load. Limitations
of size and weight are manifestly subjects within the broad range
of legislative discretion .... The requirement in Morris v. Duby,
related to the gross load limit, but we know of no constitutional
distinction which would make such legislation appropriate and
deny to the State the authority to exercise its discretion in fixing
a net load limit.
Therefore, generally limitations of weight and length are
valid. 4 There is no discrimination against interstate
33 286 U. S. 374, 76 L. Ed. 1167 (1932).
34 Contract Cartage Co. v. Morris, 59 F. (2d) 437 (1932) ; City Grocery
Co. v. State Road Dept., 60 F. (2d) 331 (1932).
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commerce since the requirement is as to all vehicles alike,
and as to any objection that it violated the contract
clause, contracts made with respect to use of the highways must be made in contemplation of the regulatory
authority of the state. 5 This statute was held valid,
and the plaintiffs' various contentions were thus overruled.
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

Further, the state may prescribe safety regulations
and requirements in the absence of Federal legislation
in the matter. 6 Of course, regulations by Congress in
the nature of a general police power in connection with
its control of commerce, such as safety requirements and
hours of labor, would override any state police power in
conflict. But requirements for the licensing of drivers
are not invalid as restrictions on interstate commerce
where there is no Federal regulation. 7 And provisions
allowing the state commission to insist that motor vehicles be kept in a safe and sanitary condition, to fix
qualifications of operators as to age and hours of service,
and to require the reporting of accidents, are manifestly
related to the safety of the state's citizens, just as are
3
traffic regulations as to speed and warning signals.
LIABILITY INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS

The states usually require the operators of motor
carriers for hire to file a liability insurance policy.
Whether or not such is a valid provision depends upon
the intent behind it. Cargo insurance cannot be required,
but public liability insurance can be. Where the construction of the statute shows that the policy is to protect the
interests of the public by securing compensation for injuries to third persons and their property from negligent
35 Tubize Chattilon Corp. v. White Transp. Co., 6 F. Supp. 15 (1934).
36 Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 77 L. Ed. 288 (1932).
37 Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 61 L. Ed. 222 (1916).
38 Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 76 L. Ed. 1155
(1932).
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operations of the carriers, the statute will be upheld.8 9
Where the attempt is made to require cargo insurance to
protect the shippers who, in the case of interstate shipments are usually nonresidents of the state, such is void
as an attempt to regulate interstate commerce, since it
has no relation to the people of the state and their safety,
or to the state roads.4 ° The states cannot require an interstate motor carrier to carry insurance covering interstate passengers or insurance against loss or injury of
41
cargo.
In Smith v. Cahoon 2 the plaintiff, a private carrier for
hire, was arrested for operating vehicles on the Florida
highways without having obtained the certificate of public convenience and necessity and without paying the tax
as required by the Florida statute. Claiming the statute
unconstitutional, he brought this petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. One section of the act provided that no
certificate should be valid until a bond was filed, amount
to be determined by the commission,
S..
for the protection, in case of passenger vehicle, of the passengers and baggage carried in said vehicle and of the public

against injury caused by negligence of the person or corporation

operating the said vehicle, and in the case of the vehicle transporting freight, for the protection of the said freight so carried
and of the public against injuries received through negligence
of the person or corporation operating said freight carrying
vehicle; . . . the said bonds shall be conditioned to indemnify

passengers and the public receiving personal injuries by any act
of negligence, and for damage to property of any person other
than the assured....

With the approval of the commission, the applicant could
file an insurance policy in lieu of a bond.
This particular statute was held void because it attempted to regulate the business of a private carrier to
Ibid.
Johnson Transfer & Freight Lines v. Perry, 47 F. (2d) 900 (1931).
41 Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554, 71 L. Ed. 1199 (1927) ; Sprout v. South
Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 72 L. Ed. 833 (1928).
42 283 U. S. 553, 75 L. Ed. 1264 (1931).
89
40
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the same extent as a common carrier, which in effect
compelled petitioner to become a common carrier,
amounting to a taking of property without due process
of law. But the court discussed the provision requiring
a bond and said:
In the present instance, the regulation as to the giving of a bond
or insurance policy to protect the public generally, in order to be
sustained, must be deemed to relate to the public safety. This is a
matter of grave concern as the highways become increasingly
crowded with motor vehicles, and we entertain no doubt of the
power of the state to insist upon suitable protection for the
public against injuries through the operations on its highways
of carriers for hire, whether they are common carriers or private
carriers.
The court went on to criticize as discriminatory the particular provisions which exempted from the giving of
such bond those who carry for hire farm products, dairy
products, fish or oysters, and the like. This was an unjust discrimination and the classification bore no relation
to the purpose for which it was made.
In Hicklin v. Coney,45 before discussed, the state court
had already construed the provision of the statute requiring bond as not imposing upon contract carriers the
requirement of obtaining and carrying cargo insurance,
but merely requiring execution of an indemnity bond to
protect the public from any acts of negligence. The high
court affirmed the decision holding this valid, saying it
was bound to follow the state court's construction, and
as so construed the statute was constitutional and within
the power of the state to control the safety of those using
its highways.44
In the Interstate Commerce Commission Report on
Co-ordination of Motor Transportation,4 5 it was stated:
The necessity for requiring interstate operators to carry
290 U. S. 169, 78 L. Ed. 247 (1933).
See also Alkazin v. Wells, 47 F. (2d) 904 (1931) ; Louis v. Boynton,
53 F. (2d) 471 (1931) ; Sage v. Baldwin, 55 F. (2d) 968 (1932) ; Roadway
Express v. Murray, 60 F. (2d) 293 (1932) ; Cobb v. Dept. of Public Works,
60 F. (2d) 631 (1932) ; Deppman v. Murray, 5 F. Supp. 661 (1934).
45 182 I. C. C. 263, 373 (1932).
43

44
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liability insurance is perhaps greater than in the case of intrastate operators because the former are operating without any
showing of public convenience and necessity and without any

showing of financial responsibility and some of them are of the

fly-by-night types. Well-organized interstate carriers as a rule
carry liability and indemnity insurance.
Particular provisions of state statutes covering the
number and color of lights, flares, etc., are clearly within
the power of the state to protect the safety of its citizens,
as such are warning signals designating the truck on a
46
dark highway, and preventing negligent accidents.
RECIPROCITY AMONG STATES

The various states have generally provided for reciprocal rights, to honor like rights in the sister states.
Such provisions have been sustained as valid, and the
mere fact that a foreign vehicle is not or cannot be
brought within the class to be benefited by such provision
does not discriminate against it. 47 The usual style of the
provision is to authorize vehicles owned by nonresidents,
properly registered in the city or state of the owner and
carrying license plates as evidence of the fact, to use the
state.highways for a certain period without registration
or tax. It was such a provision in the Minnesota state
law which was upheld in Storaasli v. Minnesota,48 where
the court said, "If the state determines to extend a privilege to nonresidents, it may with propriety limit the concession to those who have duly registered their vehicles
in another state or country."
FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER ACT

The passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 19354' by
Congress has altered the entire picture since it repre46 Atlantic-Pacific Stages, Inc. v. Stahl, 36 F. (2d) 260 (1929) ; Contract
Cartage Co. v. Morris, 59 F. (2d) 437 (1932).
47 Roadway Express v. Murray, 60 F. (2d) 293 (1932).
48 283 U. S.57, 75 L. Ed. 839 (1931).
49 U. S. C. A., Tit. 49, secs. 301-327. For valuable discussions of the act
see Warren H. Wagner, A Legislative History of the Motor Carrier Act,
1935 (Denton, Maryland: Rue Publishing Company, 1935), and Parker
McCollester and Frank J. Clark, Federal Motor Carrier Regulation (New
York: Traffic Publishing Company, 1935).

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

sents Federal regulation of a field hitherto unregulated
save by the individual states. As before stated, the validity of these state laws on matters affecting interstate
commerce depends upon the absence of national legislation. ° Now Congress has spoken on this very important
subject. Some of the comments found in the reports of
the committees of the House of Representatives and the
Senate throw interesting light on the purpose of the bill:
Regulation of motor carriers is, in effect, in nearly all of the
States, growing from relatively minor beginnings until it now
embraces common carriers of passengers in 47 States and the
District of Columbia, common carriers of property in 42 States
and the District of Columbia, contract carriers of property in
31 States and private carriers of property in 8 States. The State
regulatory commissions are strongly urging Congress to enact
Federal regulation to "stop the gaps" in State regulation and to
enable them more effectively to regulate intrastate transportation. The practically unrestrained use of State highways by
interstate motor carriers has long been a serious handicap to the
successful administration of State regulatory laws. Carriers for
hire, of all types, generally concede the need for public regulation in some form. They want some restraining hand. 51
And in a House report the following appeared:
Conformity with existing State regulations is a very desirable
feature in this bill ....

We can only have such a system by regu-

lation of all agencies of public transportation in such a manner
that there will be the least conflict between5 the
State regulations
2
and interstate regulation of motor carriers.
These quotations, though lengthy, explain the object of
the framers of the act itself, and clarify the declaration
of policy as set out in the second section thereof:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to regulate
transportation by motor carriers in such manner as to recognize
and preserve the inherent advantages of, and foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation and among such carriers in the public interest; promote adequate, economical, and
50 See footnote 3.
51 Report of Committee on Interstate Commerce, U. S. Senate, No. 482,
p. 3, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 11, 1935.
52 Report of Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U. S.
House of Representatives, No. 1645, p. 3, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., July 24, 1935.
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efficient service by motor carriers, and reasonable charges
therefor, without unjust discrimination, undue preferences or
advantages, and unfair or destructive competitive practices; improve the relations between, and co-ordinate transportation by
and regulation of, motor carriers and other carriers; develop and
preserve a highway transportation system properly adapted to

the needs of the commerce of the United States and of the national defense; and co-operate with the several States and the
duly authorized officials thereof and with any organization of
motor carriers in the administration and enforcement of this
part. 53

The act was passed after years of effort to produce
such a measure. Because of the many mechanical improvements in motor vehicles and the increasing miles
of good roads, the highways have become crowded with
cars, and the growth of the use of the motor truck has
been amazing. Its principal value has been in short hauls,
and the advantages of pick-up and store-door delivery
service. But the coast-to-coast trip described in the opening paragraph has indicated that the saving of time and
money may extend as well to long distance hauls. The
rise of joint rail and truck business, whereby either the
railroads may own their own trucks and use them for
pick-up and delivery of less than carload lots, or the
trucking interests run their loaded trailers on to flatcars
which then carry them to destinations where they are
picked up by trucks, points the way to a new phase of
freight traffic.
The motor carriers have cut into the revenue of the
railroads tremendously, and the railroads have constantly complained of the freedom of such motor carriers
from Federal legislation. Now such freedom is a thing
of the past, and the larger trucking concerns are not ill
pleased because it means that racketeering and cutthroat
operation will be practically at an end. Of course, the
threat that motor buses and trucks were going to be
regulated solely in the interests of the railroads was a
53 U. S. C. A., Tit. 49, sec. 302 (a).
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possibility, but under the declaration of policy in the act,
such should be remote. The hope is for a system of
"co-ordinated transportation for the Nation which will
supply the most efficient means of transport and furnish
service as cheaply as is consistent with fair treatment of
labor and with earnings which will support adequate
credit and the ability to expand as need develops. ' "
The provisions of the act apply to transportation of
persons or property by motor carriers in interstate or
foreign commerce, and to the procurement and provision
of facilities for such, and regulation thereof. The act covers both common and contract carriers.
Under its terms, the Interstate Commerce Commission
can fix requirements for uniform systems of accounts,
records and reports, qualifications and maximum hours
of service of employees, and safety of operation and
equipment. No common carrier can operate on the highways in interstate commerce without a certificate of public convenience and necessity, and no contract carrier
can do so without a permit. Brokerage licenses are required of those engaged in procuring contracts for such
transportation. Certificates and permits may be transferred, subject to rules of the Commission, which is also
to supervise consolidation, merger, and acquisition of
control of motor carriers. No certificate nor permit will
issue until compliance with rules of the Commission as
to liability insurance. The Commission is to supervise
rates and to see that they are not excessive, discriminatory, or unduly preferential or prejudicial. Tariffs of
the common carriers and schedules of the contract carriers are to be filed and published. Methods of collections
of rates and charges are set forth, and penalties for violating the act are named. The Commission is authorized
to issue plates identifying interstate carriers, and to in54 Report of Committee on Interstate Commerce, U. S. Senate, No. 482,
p. 3, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 11, 1935.

REGULATION OF INTERSTATE MOTOR CARRIERS

265

vestigate and report on the need for Federal regulation
of the sizes and weights of motor vehicles and qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of
the carriers.
Therefore, it now appears that there is Federal legislation on all the points involved in the cases herein reviewed under state statutes save one, the right of the
state to tax for the privilege of the use of its highways.
As to that the Motor Carrier Act specifically says,
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the powers
of taxation of the several States or to authorize a motor carrier
to do an intrastate business on the highways of any State, or to
interfere with the exclusive exercise by each State of the power
of regulation of intrastate commerce by motor carriers on the
highways thereof. 55
The general policy is to be one of noninterference with
state regulation except as such causes disadvantage or
prejudice to persons or localities in interstate commerce.
But Congress has gone even further than it did in connection with rail carriers, since it has forbidden the Commission to interfere with intrastate commerce of motor
carriers even to protect interstate commerce. There is
a proviso attached to the paragraph giving the Commission power to establish rates, which reads as follows:
Provided however, That nothing in this chapter shall empower
the Commission to prescribe, or in any manner regulate, the rate,
fare, or charge for intrastate transportation, or for any service
connected therewith, for the purpose of removing discrimination
against interstate commerce or for any other purpose whatever. 50
This prevents any holding in regard to motor carrier
intrastate rates such as was reached with rail rates in
the famous Shreveport case," wherein it was decided
that Congress had the power to control the intrastate
rail rates maintained by a carrier under state authority
55
56
57
1341

U. S. C. A., Tit. 49, sec. 302 (c).
U. S. C. A., Tit. 49, sec. 316 (e).
Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. Ed.
(1914).
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to the extent necessary to remove unjust discrimination
against interstate commerce arising from the relation
between such intrastate rates and the interstate rates
which were reasonable in themselves.
The results of the practical application of the Motor
Carrier Act remain to be seen, since it became effective
as to rates and charges only on April 1, 1936, and many
provisions therein will have to be construed by the courts
in subsequent litigation. But one thing is certain, and
that is that the former racketeering game of trucking,
will, under this supervisory regulation, become one of
the nation's important industries, not necessarily as a
competitor of the railroads but furnishing a different
kind of service, substantially supplementary thereto58
58 For further discussion on the subject see "Interstate Trucking," Fortune
Magazine for February, 1936, Vol. XIII, No. 2, p. 47.

